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‘Wicked’ problems can’t be solved, but they can be
tamed. Increasingly, these are the problems
strategists face-and for which they are ill equipped
(Camillus, 2008, p. 98).
The 21st century has seen an increased interest
in the processes by which terrorism can be dealt
with as a policy problem. The attacks of 9/11, and
those that have followed, have marked a shift in
the attack strategies of international terrorists
towards indiscriminate mass-casualty events
within Western countries (Tucker, 2001;
Hoffman, 2002; Duyvesteyn, 2004; Kurtulus,
2011). More recently, encouragement has been
made from Al Qaeda* to mount individual attacks
using knives, thereby increasing the diversity of
attack threats. The subsequent public policy
debates have centred on the nature and evolution
of such attack strategies and the defences that
can be deployed against them; the religious and
ideological motivations that underpin the
violence; the use, or intended use, of weapons of
mass destruction; and the role of social media in
shaping the mechanisms of radicalization (Asal et
al., 2009; Browne and Silke, 2011; Kurtulus,
2011; Gill et al., 2013; Coppock and McGovern,
2014). Against this complex background, the
issue of whether terrorism is a phenomenon that
can be solved or tamed lies at the heart of the
opening quotation from Camillus and it is also a
central element of whether it is a wicked policy
problem.
‘Wicked’ problems (Churchman, 1967; Rittel
and Webber, 1973) have been the subject of
considerable debate within public management
(Weber and Khademian, 2008; Head and Alford,
2015), but the policy responses made to them
have, on occasions, perpetuated and even
escalated the problems (Kellner, 2002; Bergen
and Reynolds, 2005; Kennedy-Pipe and Vickers,
2007). Like many other forms of public sector
crisis decision-making, the threats from terrorist
attacks generate problems around the
management of various agencies and networks,
information-sharing (especially in terms of
sensitive information), and the challenges
associated with the control of uncertain outcomes
(Kapucu and Garayev, 2011; Robinson et al.,
2013; Lecy et al., 2014). The adaptive nature of
terrorism has also generated challenges for both
policy-makers and managers across a range of
public and private sector organizations. The
result is an ongoing ‘arms race’ between attackers
and defenders in which the terrorists seek to find
gaps within organizational controls and the
defenders attempt to close those gaps and further
strengthen their control processes (Faria, 2006;
English, 2013). In this context, terrorists are
innovative and, increasingly, devoid of a
constraining ethical basis for behaviour, which
means that the potential range of targets that has
to be defended is considerable and this impacts
upon information-sharing and analysis (Drake,
1998; Boin and Smith, 2006; Asal et al., 2009;
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Framing the UK’s counter-terrorism
policy within the context of a
wicked problem
Denis Fischbacher-Smith
Terrorist attacks can be seen as the ultimate wicked problem. After 9/11, terrorists moved
from so-called ‘spectacular’ events to relatively low-intensity attacks against individuals and
groups. The emergence of what has become known as the ‘home-grown’ terrorist has added a
further dimension to the ‘wicked’ nature of the problem. This paper considers the UK’s
CONTEST and PREVENT strategies as a policy response to the threats from terrorism
and the impact that the policies themselves can have on the radicalization of individuals.
The author highlights some of the limitations of the PREVENT strand of the overall
strategy and the constraints that are imposed on government policies by failing to take a
holistic perspective on the nature of the problem.
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Fischbacher-Smith and Fischbacher-Smith, 2013;
Fischbacher-Smith et al., 2010; Gill et al., 2013).
As a result, terrorism could be seen as the ultimate
wicked problem for public management due to
the adaptive nature of the principal actors, the
nature of communication and information-
gathering, and the capability development and
learning around attack strategies that has been
generated in other conflict zones (and
disseminated to interested parties) (Denning,
2010; English, 2013; Byman, 2014, 2015).
Terrorist threats as wicked problems
A key challenge arises from the range of available
targets and the methods employed by terrorist
groups to cause harm. Figure 1 illustrates the
policy space in which public management
organizations have to deal with the range of
threats from terrorist groups, whether foreign
or domestic. What makes terrorism such a wicked
policy problem is the diversity that is present
within the various attack vectors that are available
to them (and the associated intensity of those
attacks); the potential range of targets that are
open to being attacked; and the potential force
multipliers that can be found within the urban
and organizational spaces in which they choose
to mount their attack. For example 9/11 was
marked by its destructive potential, but was
implemented by the use of small, bladed weapons
that were carried on board aircraft, thereby
allowing the hijackers to bypass multiple layers
of controls that were designed to prevent such
hostile actions. By then using the aircraft
themselves as weapons, the hijackers were able
to generate a force multiplier effect that was far
in excess of the intensity of the initial attack on
board the aircraft. The asymmetrical impact of
the damage caused was also beyond the scale of
what would normally have been expected, and
the attackers were able to expose other weaknesses
in controls across the aviation system to generate
harm. Subsequent attacks against aviation by Al
Qaeda, its affiliates, and other groups inspired
by that ideology have also showed considerable
levels of innovation in pursuit of the goal of mass-
casualty events (Oh et al., 2011; Gill et al., 2013;
Kollars and Brister, 2014; Hemmingby and
Bjørgo, 2016). This has included, the so-called
‘shoe bomber’, the UK-based liquid bomb plot,
and the use of explosive underwear in failed
attempts to bring down airliners. While these
attacks were unsuccessful, they had the effect of
highlighting the vulnerabilities within the system
(Clarke and Soria, 2009; Sandler, 2011; Gill et al.,
2013; Hastings and Chan, 2013). The economic
impact of the plots was also an integral part of the
over-arching Al Qaeda strategy and remains an
active component of the group’s strategy.
The shootings in Orlando in June 2016 also
illustrate the wicked nature of such attacks from
a policy perspective. The attack marked the
worst case of civil gun violence in America’s
recent history and its categorization is an
important element in the formulation of policy
responses to it. Was this an act of terror or a hate
crime perpetrated against the LGBT community
by a violent individual? As Islamic State took
responsibility for the attack and the perpetrator
also made phone calls stating his affiliation to the
group, the FBI investigated it as a terrorist
incident. In this case, it can be considered as the
worst terrorist attack in the USA since 9/11.
However, it was also clearly an attack on the
LGBT community itself and President Obama
referred to it as both an act of terror and one of
hate. This is not the first time that such an attack
has been seen through multiple lenses. For
example, in 1999, a nail bomb was placed in the
Admiral Duncan pub in London’s Soho district,
which was a popular venue for the LGBT
community in the area (Newburn and Matassa,
2002; Blackbourn, 2006; Dwyer, 2014). The
perpetrator of the bombing was neo-nazi David
Copeland (Bowling, 2000; Greaves, 2000) and,
in many respects, he was an early example of
what has now become known as ‘lone wolf’
terrorism (Spaaij, 2012). This attack on the LGBT
community in London has been seen as a
watershed in the creation of a supportive
relationship between the community and the
police (Dwyer, 2014)—a process that might not
have occurred had the attack been labelled as a
terrorist act. Thus, the nuances of the
categorization can have wide implications for
policy and practice.
The second issue of note, and one that is
Figure 1. The policy space for terrorist attacks.
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pertinent to the Orlando shootings, concerns
the definition of terrorism itself. There has been
considerable debate over the exact meaning of
the term and the analytical problems that this
lack of an accepted definition brings (Tucker,
2001; Ganor, 2002; Hoffman, 2002; Duyvesteyn,
2004; Hülsse and Spencer, 2008; English, 2009;
Clarke and Soria, 2010). English (2009) highlights
both the practical and the analytical aspects of
terrorism and points to their symbiotic nature.
He argues that it is difficult to manage a policy
issue when a definition of the core term is
ambiguous and, in some cases, defined differently
by agencies operating within the same country.
He also highlights the different definitional
challenges that can arise if terrorism is framed in
terms of the underlying ideology, motivations,
and the targets chosen (English, 2009). It is
particularly challenging when one of the
hallmarks of terrorist acts is increasingly framed
in terms of the innovations that they undertake
to bypass organizational controls to cause harm.
As the perpetrator in the Orlando shootings
had been interviewed by the FBI about his views,
then the case highlights a third issue around
such attacks. This relates to the ‘calculative
practices’ (Miller, 2001) associated with the
determination of risk in such cases, where the
evidential basis for risk is shrouded in uncertainty
and where, even with the benefit of hindsight,
prediction is still an imprecise process!
Given the ambiguity that exists around the
exact nature of what constitutes terrorism, its
principal characteristics, the difficulties associated
with the determination of risk, and the points of
intervention that are available to policy-makers,
then it should not be surprising that it meets
many of the main elements of a wicked problem
as set out by Rittel and Webber (1973). Table 1
provides an illustration of the nature of terrorism
set against the main elements of the wicked
problem construct. While it is not meant to be an
inclusive listing, table 1 illustrates how these
examples of terrorism can be set against the main
elements of wicked problems. The paper now
turns its attention to considering the challenges
that terrorism generates for public policy. It
begins by looking at the range of threats that
exist within the counter-terrorism policy space
and then looks in more detail at the UK’s policy
response.
CONTEST: the UK’s counter-terrorism strategy
The range of current terrorist threats has
prompted many Western governments to seek
to identify and disrupt the processes by which
terrorists become radicalized into committing
violent acts and also disrupting the networks that
underpin this process. In the UK, the main
policy instrument currently used to deal with
terrorism is the CONTEST strategy (HM
Government, 2009, 2011a). CONTEST has four
main elements: Pursue, Prevent, Protect, and
Prepare (HM Government, 2009). These
elements are interlinked but invariably involve
different organizations, with different cultures,
and can generate a range of issues around
information-sharing protocols. Again, this can
be seen to contribute to the maintenance of
terrorism policy as a wicked problem due to the
different perspectives that are brought to bear
on it, the policy strategies aimed at resolving it,
and the challenges around information-sharing
among the various organizations charged with
implementing the strategy.
The development of the CONTEST strategy
has evolved since the first report was published
in 2003 (Home Affairs Committee, 2009; HM
Government, 2009, 2011a) and a key element in
its evolution has been that of PREVENT which
is aimed, as its name implies, at preventing
vulnerable individuals from becoming radicalized
(HM Government, 2009, 2011b, 2015; Coppock
and McGovern, 2014). The PREVENT strategy
seeks to identify and respond to early indications
of behavioural changes, and is held to be
grounded in psychological theories and
particularly around the processes that exist in
the various channels through which radicalization
occurs (HM Government, 2012, 2015). In the
Queen’s speech made at the opening of
Parliament in May 2016, the UK government set
out its next phase for the development of its
counter-radicalization strategy. However, despite
the claims around the theoretical basis of the
process, the PREVENT strategy has not been
met with universal approval and there have been
concerns expressed about the focus of the policy
(Kundnani, 2012; Sukarieh and Tannock, 2016).
While the UK government’s strategies are
claimed to focus on all forms of violent extremism
(which transcend a range of religious and socially-
motivated ideologies), much of the focus has
been seen to be on extremist Islamist groups and
their explicit strategies of radicalization. The
reason for this focus is that these extremist groups
have shown themselves to be particularly effective
at radicalizing young people in large numbers
and defining those who will not join their jihad
as ‘apostate’. The stated strategy of Islamic State/
Daesh, for example, is to ensure that they destroy
the ‘grey zone’ that is inhabited by those Muslims
who do not share their extremist views (Ahmed,
2015; Anon., 2015). The counter-radicalization
policies of Western governments have also been
used to illustrate the ‘oppression’ and
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Table 1. The nature of terrorism versus the main elements of the wicked problem construct.
Elements of a wicked problem* Relevant characteristics of terrorism as a policy problem
The parameters of the problem are not • The ideological basis of terrorism generates problems around dealing with the
easily identified root cause of the issues
• Potential attack vectors and targets are wide and diverse with, in some cases, a
global reach through organizational value chains
• Demands from terrorist groups are often too extreme for national governments
to accept (generating a challenge to the deep core beliefs and values of the state)
There are ‘no-stopping rules’ associated • Terrorist threats have been an issue for decades and are constantly evolving and
with wicked problems leading to a adapting
constant search for solutions • Solving one particular set of issues will not address the problem of terrorism in an
holistic way
• Changing demands from terrorist groups prevent a generic solution to the problem
• The demands of some groups are fundamentally at odds with the culture of those
states in which the groups live
Solutions to wicked problems are • Failures to deal with early warnings and weak signals invariably prove problematic
essentially a matter of judgement— as intelligence-gathering is compromised
there is no right/wrong solution • Increased surveillance of groups can lead to further processes of radicalization
• The impacts of foreign policy can generate a sense of injustice and this combines with
marginalization of some minorities to create the environment in which
radicalization can thrive
There are no effective solutions to • Solutions to terrorism invariably require some sort of compromise—this can be
wicked problems due to the presence problematic, depending on the nature of the demands and the views
of emergent conditions inherent • Increasingly, the shifts in attack strategies towards a roving shooter style tactic are
within them difficult to defend against and are asymmetric in terms of resource requirements
• A multitude of targets makes target-hardening a complex and expensive task
• Increased surveillance of the population generates opposition within many democratic
settings
Solutions to wicked problems are not • Increasingly problematic around suicide terrorism as it is very difficult to defend
open to trial-and-error learning— against
interventions generate conditions • Attempts to deal with suicide terrorists have generated accusations of a shoot-to-kill policy and
that cannot be reversed create the potential for adverse events arising from mistaken identity and poor intelligence
The solutions to wicked problems • The complex nature of the problem generates demands for multi-level responses
are not easily articulated and that are difficult to implement
framed • Effective counter-terrorism is resource intensive, often socially intrusive, and requires
effective knowledge management
Wicked problems generate a • Environmental conditions and the intentions of the attackers can generate unique
range of unique conditions conditions that bypass organizational controls and safeguards
• Urban environments generate conditions that can be used as force multipliers by
terrorists (crowded spaces, vulnerable populations, iconic sites, communications and
transport technologies)
• Terrorist groups increasingly are aware about security and surveillance challenges
resulting in ever-more sophisticated organizational structures and detection avoidance
strategies
Wicked problems are interlinked • The interconnected nature of modern societies provides additional opportunities
with other problems and are not for harm arising from an attack—just-in-time processes are turned against the
self-contained organizations that deploy them
• Cutbacks in public sector organizations can weaken resilience and coping strategies
around terrorism
• Government policies (both domestic and foreign) contribute to radicalization processes
The stakeholders involved in • A security mindset is often problematic for some organizational cultures, which see
wicked problems have different their role as being more open to the public (for example hospitals, educational
perspectives, resulting in establishments, public places, entertainment venues) rather than controlled environments
discrepancies between policy • Organizations involved in de-radicalization processes often do not have the
and practice commitment to the policy (notably educational institutions, healthcare organizations)
Decision-makers are responsible for the • Failures to prevent attacks invariably lead to the generation of harm and associated
consequences that their interventions outrage at the failures of the state to prevent such events
around wicked problems generate • Early intervention often generates negative publicity about state surveillance and
due to their significance the claimed harassment of certain groups in society
*Sources: Rittel and Webber (1973); Camillus (2008); Weber and Khademian (2008).
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victimization that Islamic State and Al Qaeda are
claiming to be fighting against.
As a concept, ‘radicalization’ is also something
of a contested term (Sedgwick, 2010; Kundnani,
2012, 2014) and this generates ambiguities
around the processes that underpin it—if
agreement can’t be reached on the parameters
of the problem then it will be difficult, if not
impossible, to agree on a policy approach to it.
For some, the definition of radicalization chosen
by policy-makers serves to construct large
segments of society as suspect communities
(Kundnani, 2012), with the attendant problems
around social cohesion that such stigmatization
creates. Again, this lack of clarity around the
parameters of the problem and the different
views held by stakeholders are important
elements in the generation of a wicked problem.
As part of the wicked problem argument, it
is also necessary to assess whether the PREVENT
strategy and the associated Channel framework
(HM Government, 2012, 2015) are able to meet
the performance criteria for the design of such a
socio-technical system. In particular, there are
questions about the potential gaps that exist
between the theoretical basis for the policy and
its use in practice. Any assessment of the
effectiveness of PREVENT should require an
appraisal of whether there is inter-organizational
consensus around the main ‘source types’ that
serve to shape the cultural dynamics of the
process (Reason, 1987, 1993, 1997)—namely,
commitment, awareness and competence—and
the role that these cultural artifacts can play
around managing and disrupting the processes
of radicalization. Put another way, if the various
organizations involved in PREVENT do not
have the commitment to address the problem,
then they will not generate the awareness that is
needed to identify and respond to the early
warnings of radical behaviours, or develop the
competencies needed to intervene in an effective
manner. As many of these partners are public
sector organizations—notably, education, social
work, the prison service, and the National Health
Service—then it is not surprising that there is
some opposition to PREVENT among those
who are required to implement it (Anon., 2014;
O’Donnell, 2016; Saeed and Johnson, 2016). In
addition, there is also the issue of whether those
organizations also have the capabilities (as well as
the commitment) in terms of identifying early-
stage radicalization and reporting those concerns
to the police. This is an issue of particular concern
within education where debating extremist views
is seen as an essential part of countering them
(Brown and Saeed, 2015; Davies, 2016; Durodie,
2016; Saeed and Johnson, 2016). Maintaining
awareness within and between these various
organizations is also likely to be problematic and
expensive to implement. Even at this superficial
level, it can be argued that the current PREVENT
strategy also contributes to the framing of counter-
terrorism as a wicked problem because of the
inter-linked nature of the issues around
implementation, the different perspectives held
by stakeholders, and the judgmental nature of
the intervention process at the operational level.
The source types identified by Reason will
also have a significant impact on an organization’s
abilities to develop a minimum critical
specification for the processes in question
(Cherns, 1976, 1987). Within the context of
PREVENT, this will relate to the various task
demands that the implementing organizations
face as a result of dealing with radicalization
processes. A number of interlinked issues and
challenges (May, 2011; Parker, 2013, 2015)
impact upon the implementation of PREVENT
within public sector organizations.
First, the strategy has to deal with a perverse
ideology that provides both a theological, political,
and in some cases an intellectual rationale for the
terrorists’ actions. While this ideology is often
abhorrent to many, it does seem able to strike a
chord among some young and disaffected
individuals.
Second, a key driver for this disaffection is
seen to be generated by conflict and instability in a
number of countries and especially where the
crusader analogy has been used to evoke images
of a holy war (Ford, 2001; Waldman and Pope,
2001; Kellner, 2004; O’Donnell, 2004; Mazid,
2007). Unless PREVENT takes account of the
role played by UK foreign policy in shaping the
nature of that conflict and associated instability,
then it will continue to allow the propagation of
the ideologies around exploitation and
oppression that underpin radicalization. The
processes and tools available for the dissemination
of ideas around such conflicts are also important.
The use of modern technology is the third core
element that can confound the success of the
PREVENT strategy, as terrorist groups are able
to utilize those technologies as both a means of
disseminating their ideological messages but also,
in the case of critical infrastructures, as a potential
target that will cause disruption to Western
economies (Tsfati and Weimann, 2002; Conway,
2006; Denning, 2010; Klausen, 2015). The
obvious tensions here relate to the freedom of
speech and expression (within the limits of the
law), that is the cornerstone of democratic
societies, and the need to curtail all forms of
inflammatory communication. What is evident
is that both Al Qaeda and Islamic State are adept
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in the use of social media and other forms of
communication to spread their message.
Each of these three elements has the potential
to add to the framing of terrorism as a wicked
policy problem and they directly impact on the
specific outcomes of radicalization that are the
focus of attention within the PREVENT strategy.
The interactions between these four main
elements (perverse ideology; conflict and
instability; modern technology; radicalization)
generate a range of issues at the points where
they overlap. Again, these second-order issues
can contribute to the processes around the
generation of a wicked problem. These are:
(a) Core psychological processes around
radicalization—the processes here are complex
and the theoretical processes around
radicalization are often simply ill-understood.
The issues here sit at the interface between
psychology and sociology and terrorism should
not be characterized as a mental health problem,
although there will be some individuals attracted
to the cause that will have such a diagnosis. Many
of these issues sit with areas relevant to social
psychology, especially around group dynamics,
leadership, and identity (Reicher and Haslam,
2016). In addition to the processes surrounding
psychological characteristics and socialization
mechanisms, there are challenges around
communication, the power of beliefs and values,
and the role that trust plays in dealing with the
conflicting messages that emerge from various
sources. The ability to shift away from a particular
ideological stance is especially challenging as it
often involves changes to the core beliefs and
values of the individual. This central core of
psycho-social elements also contributes to the
wicked problem categorization of terrorism due
to the difficulties in framing them, their
interlinked nature, the unique conditions
prevailing (in space and time) at the point of
radicalization, and the different world-views held
by the various actors that help to determine the
acceptance or rejection of different ideologically-
based claims.
(b) Conflict provides a sense of injustice that both
fuels and feeds off a pervasive ideology. It also
generates a diaspora that can serve to heighten
the sense of injustice among immigrants who are
marginalized. Many of the issues raised in the
media around the movements of people from
war zones in Syria and Iraq have centred on the
potential vulnerabilities of those groups to
radicalization. Invariably, many of these claims
are not evidence-based but they can serve to fuel
distrust among some groups in society who see
refugees as a potential threat (both economically
and socially), thereby adding to the potential
marginalization of those communities. To be
successful, PREVENT also has to deal with the
radical (and often xenophobic) views of those
groups within society rather than being seen to
simply target Muslim communities. It also needs
to work to refute erroneous claims made within
elements of the media around the perceived
risks of domestic-terrorists by providing a more
structured, evidence-based approach to
challenging such views.
(c) These international conflicts also drive the
processes of radicalization by providing additional
‘evidence’ that can be used in support of the
ideological stance taken by radicalized groups.
That sense of injustice can then carry over into a
domestic setting in which national and
international views around injustice can feed off
each other (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010; Bangstad,
2013; Borum, 2014; Coppock and McGovern,
2014).
(d) Modern technology provides the mechanisms
by which a malevolent ideology is transmitted. It
also generates the mechanisms by which tactical
information around attack mechanisms is shared
among those who have a predisposition to act on
their sense of injustice and other grievances.
(e) Radicalized groups and individuals can also
use modern technology as an attack vector to
cause maximum harm by attacking
infrastructures that Western countries rely on.
The vulnerability of critical national
infrastructure via attacks on the computer
network is an issue that has attracted attention
from both the policy and the academic
communities (Boin and Smith, 2006; Cavelty,
2008; Geers, 2009; Rudner, 2013).
There are, therefore, significant challenges
around the ways in which CONTEST and
PREVENT are implemented and which may
also serve to contribute to the maintenance of the
current set of terrorist threats being considered
as a wicked problem. The management of
counter-terrorism policy remains a challenge for
public management and one that is likely to
continue to prove both problematic and
persistent.
Conclusions
This paper has sought to show that the
management of terrorist-related policies has some
deep-rooted elements that have served to
generate a wicked problem and will mitigate
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against effective intervention through
PREVENT. To-date, there has been little
discussion of these challenges within the
‘management’ academy, despite the potential
impact that terrorism has to disrupt the effective
working of organizations across both the public
and private sector and this, combined with what
could be seen as a relative lack of engagement
with research in forensic and social psychology,
would suggest that the existing policy problems
are unlikely to become any less wicked in the
foreseeable future.
The paper highlighted the ways in which
terrorism can be framed as a wicked policy
problem, by focusing on the nature of the UK’s
policy response and the challenges that it creates
in terms of making an effective contribution to
the policy task demands that terrorism generates.
In particular, the paper argues that the main
policy challenges relate to the difficulties around
the management of inter-agency networks; the
problems associated with disrupting the
dissemination of terrorist ideologies (while not
constraining freedom of speech); and a range of
issues around information-sharing within a
secure policy environment. These issues then
interact with the difficulties associated with
dealing with a dynamic, potentially-transient,
trans-national, and hostile set of actors. The
result of these interactions is the creation of an
extremely complex policy space that is essentially
‘wicked’ in both the nature of the hostile actors’
intent and the problems generated for security
agencies and policy bodies in terms of response.
Additional work is needed to consider how
the design of such policy interventions around
terrorism can be more evidence-based and
especially in terms of the evidence associated
with the creation of policy instruments such as
PREVENT and CONTEST. There are, of course,
considerable challenges here for the academy in
helping practitioners to engage with that evidence
base and these centre around access to
information about the practices of security and
its relationship to other forms of public
management; the applicability of more general
theories around public management to the
security space; and the development of a
consensus within the academy itself and especially
around the main calculative processes that
underpin terrorism policies. These remain quite
significant barriers to the development of research
that could serve to help shape policy in a more
effective manner. There is also a clear need to
ensure that the underpinning psychological
research that informs processes of counter-
radicalization is robust and effectively grounded
in the specific characteristics of the various groups
that are in danger of being radicalized. At present,
the current policy is too broad in its scope, puts
the responsibilities for identifying early-stage
radicalization on organizations for whom it is not
their primary concern (and for which they are ill-
equipped), and there is an insufficient research
evidence base available to them to show how
effective the various forms of intervention might
be. Recent concerns expressed by those who will
now be charged with implementing PREVENT
have pointed to this lack of an evidence base and
the challenges associated with addressing
extremist views, especially without appropriate
training for the task. As a consequence, dealing
with terrorist threats is likely to remain a wicked
policy problem and one that will continue to
evolve and challenge public management to
respond in an effective manner.
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IMPACT
This paper presents a critique of the current PREVENT strategy, the UK’s policy response to
the threats from terrorism, by exploring it through the analytical lens provided by the
academic ‘wicked’ problem literature. It highlights the challenges associated with a radicalization
agenda, especially when that term is itself contested, and has highlighted what can be seen as
the evolutionary nature of terrorist threats. These challenges are:
Challenges for practice
•Policies around de-radicalization need to reflect the ambiguity that exists within the term
‘radicalization’ and also the potentially weak empirical and theoretical basis on which
government policies are developed. One size does not fit all within this particular policy space
and, as a result, the complexity within the task environment needs to be reflected in the
complexity that is inherent in the policy response.
•The wicked nature of the problem also generates task demands in terms of the interlinked
nature of such issues. PREVENT needs to be linked into a range of other social, political,
and economic policies in order to be successful. Simply framing it in terms of extremist views
without acknowledging the contribution of other interlinked issues will reinforce the wicked
problem element of the issue.
•In the wicked problem literature it is argued that decision-makers have responsibility for
policy interventions. Passing the responsibilities around PREVENT down to organizations
and agencies at the sharp end, without allowing them to become involved in the dialogue
around the nature of extremism and the responses that should be made to it, is a key problem.
Challenges for research
•A problem at the core of many of the policy debates in this area is the lack of agreement about
the definitions of the key terms ‘terrorism’ and ‘radicalization’ and the associated implications
for the development of effective interventions. Such ambiguity and associated complexity
in turn allows terrorism to remain a wicked problem.
•Social psychology research has much to offer public management theory in this area and a
greater emphasis on multi-disciplinary working is essential in dealing with wicked policy
problems.
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For service-based organizations in the public sector, calculative approaches to risk management
are shrouded in uncertainty and this makes the predictive validity associated with such
calculative practices more difficult to achieve. Issues around patient safety, child protection, and
the provision of security against a range of threats are all typified by the involvement of diverse
actors in the process, some of whom are benign and some malevolent. This makes the
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